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Introduction
The Netherlands suffers from a relatively high structural
unemployment rate among unskilled workers. In parti-
cular, the unemployment rate in 1996 among the low-
skilled was more than twice the unemployment rate of
skilled workers. One explanation for this phenomenon
is thought to be the poor labour-market incentives for the
unemployed. Indeed, the replacement rate for low-skilled
workers, i.e. the net benefit in terms of the net wage rate,
is rather high in the Netherlands. This depresses the moti-
vation for the low skilled to search for work and makes
them reluctant to accept employment. Recent tax pro-
posals in the Netherlands focus, therefore, on reducing
the replacement rate among the low skilled – e.g. through
the introduction of a so-called Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). Indeed, the recent White Paper on taxes in the
21st century in the Netherlands contains a proposal for an
EITC. 
The EITC has already been used in the United States
for over 20 years. In the US, however, the primary goal of
the EITC is to reduce poverty among low-income work-
ers, rather than reducing the unemployment rate at the
bottom of the labour market. Therefore, the design of
the EITC that has been proposed in the Netherlands dif-
fers from the one that exists in the US. 
This paper discusses the optimal design of the EITC
in the Netherlands in light of the goal of reducing unem-
ployment. To that end, it adopts an applied general equi-
librium model for the Netherlands, called MIMIC. This
model has been developed to explore the labour-market
effects of various tax policies and policies related to social
security reforms.
The Earned Income Tax Credit in the US
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was introduced in
the US in 1975. It started out as a small programme aimed
at offsetting the social payroll tax for poor working fami-
lies with children. Major expansions of the programme
came later. The EITC is now the largest cash programme
directed at low-income households.
To be eligible for the EITC, a family must meet three
requirements. First, there must be positive earned income.
Indeed, the EITC is a credit directed only at people who
work; income from other sources than work is discounted
from the income used to calculate the EITC. Second, the
earned income of a family should be smaller than a cer-
tain threshold. In 1996, the maximum income (under the
programme) for a family with two children was $28,495.
Third, the taxpayer should care for a child younger than
the age of 19, a child younger than 24 who is a full-time
student, or a child who is disabled, regardless of age. Since
1994, there exists a small credit for workers without 
children.
The EITC contains three ranges. Figure 1 illustrates the
credit in these ranges for a household with two children
in relation to its total family income for 1996. First, in the
phase-in range, represented by AB in figure 1, people
receive a credit of 40% of their earned income. In 1996,
the phase-in range runs up to a maximum income of
$8,890. The line BC in figure 1 represents the so-called flat
range. In particular, households with an annual earned
income between $8,890 and $11,610 receive a maximum
credit of $3,556. Finally, in the phase-out range, repre-
sented by the line CD in figure 1, each additional dollar of
earned income reduces the credit by 21 cents. Accordingly,
people with an annual income above $28,495 are no longer
eligible for the credit.
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Studies on the economic effects of the
American EITC
Research on the economic effects of the EITC in the US
has focussed primarily on the effects on labour supply. In
particular, standard economic theory suggests that the
EITC affects labour supply through three main channels.
First, it reduces the average tax burden on labour income.
This may stimulate the participation of people who are
currently (voluntarily) outside the labour force. Second,
the lower average tax burden for households that are eli-
gible for the EITC adversely affects the incentives to sup-
ply labour through the income effect. Finally, the EITC
affects the marginal tax burden on households. In par-
ticular, the marginal tax burden declines for people in the
phase-in range, remains constant for households in the
flat range, and rises for those households with an earned
income in the phase-out range. Whereas the lower mar-
ginal tax burden in the phase-in range raises the incen-
tives for labour supply by inducing substitution from leisure
to consumption, the higher marginal tax burden in the
phase-out range reduces the number of hours supplied
by labour. On balance, the income effect and the two
opposing substitution effects render the effect on aggre-
gate labour supply in hours ambiguous. Indeed, the effect
on aggregate labour supply is an empirical matter and
will depend on the magnitude of labour-supply elastici-
ties and the number of people in the different ranges of
the EITC.
A number of empirical studies have explored the EITC’s
effect on aggregate labour in the US. Table 1 provides an
overview of the results from those studies. First, simula-
tions by Dickert et al. (1995) suggest that the negative
effects on labour supply, associated with the income effect
and the negative substitution effect in the phase-out range,
dominate the positive effects due to the lower marginal
tax burden in the phase-in range. Hence, the EITC reduces
aggregate labour supply. According to Eissa and Liebman
(1996), however, this conclusion may be misleading since
it ignores the potential effects of the EITC on the partici-
pation rate. In particular, since the EITC is provided only
to households with an earned income, it may stimulate
the labour supply of people who currently do not partic-
ipate in the labour market. Indeed, Eissa and Liebman find
that the participation effect is significantly positive for 
single women with children. Furthermore, estimates of
Eissa and Liebman suggest that the effect of the EITC on
hours worked does not significantly differ from zero.
Accordingly, they conclude that there is no evidence that
the EITC decreases the labour supply of people already
in the labour force. Browning (1995), however, argues that
the positive effects on labour supply found by Eissa and
Liebman may well be overestimated. In particular, a 
number of people in the phase-in range are likely to have
higher expected earnings in the future, even without the
EITC. As most labour-supply decisions are long-term 
decisions, the positive effect of the EITC will be counter-
acted if a large portion of the people in the phase-in range
realise that they are in this range only temporarily. 
Effects of a Dutch EITC based on annual
incomes
We have adopted the MIMIC model to explore the eco-
nomic impact of an EITC in the Netherlands. MIMIC is an
applied general equilibrium model for the Dutch Economy
that is designed to explore the effects of tax policies for
the Dutch labour market. The model contains a disaggre-
gated description of the household sector by distinguishing
40 types of households. For each type, the model adopts
class-frequency income distributions based on micro data.
This micro approach paves the way for a detailed assess-
ment of the fraction of people in each household type that
belongs to a specified income range. Accordingly, MIMIC
is an appropriate tool to calculate the impact of an EITC
on the labour market. For a more elaborate description of
MIMIC, see Graafland and De Mooij (1998).1
The EITC that has been analysed with MIMIC differs
from the one implemented in the US tax system in two
respects. First, it depends on individual income, rather
than family income. Second, the EITC that is analysed with
MIMIC does not depend on the number of children.
Although this alternative design of the EITC makes it dif-
ficult to compare the effects of MIMIC with the US stud-
ies, it forms a benchmark for the simulations in the next
section that involves an EITC based on hourly wages that
was recently proposed in the Netherlands.
In our experiment, the EITC amounts to 4% of annual
labour income in the phase-in range. The maximum credit
is DFL 1,015 in a flat range between the statutory mini-
mum wage (DFL 30,000) and 115% of the minimum wage
(DFL 34,500). Subsequently, the EITC is phased out lin-
early up to 180% of the minimum wage (DFL 54,000), which
is around the median income in the Netherlands. The ex-
ante (i.e. before behavioural responses to the credit are
taken into account) reduction in tax revenue due to the
introduction of the EITC is 0.35% of GDP (i.e. 2.5 billion
guilders). The government budget is balanced ex-ante by
an equivalent reduction in government consumption. If
tax revenues increase due to behavioural responses, these
Table 1  The estimated labour supply effects of the EITC in the different studies
Aggregate Participation Phase-in Flat Phase-out
labor supply effect range range range
Dickert et al. – 0 + – –
Eissa & Liebman + + 0 0 0
Browning – 0/+ + – –
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are used to mitigate the reduction in public consumption.
Hence, the experiment is budgetary neutral ex-post. The
simulation results are presented in the first column of
Table 2.
According to the MIMIC results, an EITC in the
Netherlands is an effective instrument to reduce the unem-
ployment rate.2 Indeed, the EITC reduces the replacement
rate, especially for low-paid work. Accordingly, the unem-
ployed search more intensely for a job and reduce their
reservation wage, thereby facilitating job matching.
Furthermore, the lower replacement rate weakens the bar-
gaining position of the unions in collective bargaining.
Hence, contractual wages fall. Through these channels,
unemployment declines. Unemployment for the unskilled
falls by 0.9 percentage points.
Table 2 reveals also that the EITC increases the partic-
ipation rate. Indeed, the lower average tax burden on small
part-time jobs encourages those partners to join the labour
force who previously decided not to participate. In con-
trast to this, the average length of the work week falls. This
reduction in labour supply in hours is the result of two
opposing forces. On the one hand, secondary earners with
small part-time jobs falling in the phase-in range, raise
their average labour supply in hours, since their marginal
tax burden declines. On the other hand, partners with sub-
stantial part-time jobs, primary earners and single per-
sons reduce their labour supply because of a positive
income effect and, to the extent that they fall in the phase-
out range, a negative substitution effect associated with
a higher marginal tax rate. On balance, labour supply in
hours drops because more people fall in the phase-out
range.
According to MIMIC, the high marginal tax rate in the
phase-out range reduces also the incentives for training.
Indeed, the human capital index falls because a larger part
of wage increases due to productivity gains accrues to the
government in the form of a lower EITC. Accordingly, the
positive effects on production are mitigated. The higher
marginal tax burden also induces substitution from labour
supply in the formal sector towards the hidden economy.
Indeed, the informal sector expands.
Effects of a Dutch EITC based on hourly wages
The EITC that was analysed above is based on annual
earned income. Hence, the EITC accrues also to part-time
workers with high hourly wages but low annual incomes.
Since the Netherlands features the highest share of part-
time work of all OECD countries, providing those people
with an EITC makes the instrument ill targeted to the
unskilled. Indeed, for a given budget, each tax relief mea-
sure for part-time workers with high hourly wages crowds
out the tax relief for low skilled workers with full-time jobs
and low hourly wages. As the main objective of an EITC
in the Netherlands is to reduce the unemployment rate
among the low-skilled who collect unemployment bene-
fits, a targeted EITC that depends on hourly wages, rather
than annual incomes, seems more promising. Indeed,
such an EITC has recently been proposed by the Dutch
government in its White Paper on a tax-reform proposal.
We have employed MIMIC to explore the implications
of this proposal of the EITC. In particular, in this experi-
ment only workers who hold a full-time job and earn an
hourly wage between the minimum and 115% of the min-
imum wage are eligible for the maximum EITC. The credit
is reduced proportionally for workers who work less than
full time. Furthermore, it gradually drops with the level of
the hourly wage rate between 115% and 180% of the min-
imum wage. This alternative form of the EITC is better tar-
Table 2 Economic effects of five forms of an EITC according to MIMIC, financed by an ex-ante reduction
in public consumption by 0.35% GDP.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percentage Changes
Production 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9
Employment 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.1
Labour supply (pers.) 2.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0
Labour (hours) –0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Black labour (hours) 0.9 1.5 0.1 1.8 2.2
Human capital (index) –0.2 –0.2 0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Ratios absolute changes
Unemployment –0.5 –0.6 –0.4 –0.7 –0.6
– unskilled –0.9 –1.3 –0.7 –1.5 –1.7
Replacement ratio –0.5 –1.0 –0.6 –1.2 –1.2
Marginal burena 0.7 1.1 –0.2 0.9 0.5
a Weighted average of micro burdens on hours worked of employees
(1) An EITC for low annual wage incomes, phased out between 115%-180% of minimum wage
(2) An EITC for low hourly wage rates, phased out between 115%-180% of the minimum wage
(3) An EITC for all households that is not phased out
(4) An EITC for low hourly wage rates, phased out between 115%-150% of the minimum wage
(5) An EITC for low hourly wage rates, phased out between 115%-130% of the minimum wage
1 7
98/4
BPCR E P O R T
geted at the low skilled than the EITC based on annual
incomes. Indeed, with the same ex-ante budget of 0.35%
of GDP, the maximum credit that can be provided to low-
skilled workers with full-time jobs almost doubles to ƒ1,890.
The effects of this form of the EITC according to MIMIC
are presented by the second column of Table 2.
The EITC based on hourly wages reduces the replace-
ment rate for unskilled workers more substantially than
the EITC based on annual income. This decline in the
replacement rate reduces wages, thereby boosting demand
for labour, and especially for unskilled labour. Moreover,
the lower replacement rate stimulates the search inten-
sity and lowers the reservation wage of the low skilled,
thereby facilitating the matching process for unskilled
labour. Accordingly, the unemployment rate for the
unskilled and the low skilled drops more substantially
than under the EITC based on annual income.
The rise in the participation rate is smaller than in the
previous experiment. This is because the EITC reduces the
average tax burden only on part-time jobs with low hourly
wages. The negative effect of the EITC on labour supply
in hours has disappeared. Indeed, the increase in the mar-
ginal tax rate in the phase-out range applies only to higher
hourly wages and not to higher labour incomes on account
of more hours worked. Accordingly, labour supply in hours
drops only on account of the income effect. Both the effects
on participation and labour supply in hours are thus smaller
(in absolute value) than in the previous experiment. On
balance, aggregate labour supply in hours is unaffected.
The marginal tax rate on higher hourly wages in the
phase-out range is higher than in the previous experiment
because the maximum credit is twice as large. This harms
the incentives to accumulate human capital. Hence,
although an EITC that depends on hourly wages does less
harm to the quantity of labour supply, it still harms the
quality of labour supply. Furthermore, we see that the
higher marginal tax burden boosts the size of the hid-
den economy because employers and workers have more
incentives to pay part of the wage bill in an informal way,
i.e. without reporting it to the tax authority.
Sensitivity analysis: targeting the EITC
In the previous experiment, the EITC was phased out
between 115% and 180% of the minimum wage. The last
three columns of Table 2 show the effects of various EITCs
(based on hourly wages) with alternative phase-out ranges. 
No phase-out range
In the experiment in the third column, there is no phase-
out range. In that case, the maximum EITC of DFL 435 is
provided to all workers. Accordingly, the replacement rate
for the unskilled declines less than in the previous exper-
iments, but the replacement rate for high- and low-skilled
workers drops more. Without phasing out the EITC, the
marginal tax rate does not increase.
The lower replacement rate increases the search effort
of the unemployed, reduces their reservation wage, and
reduces gross wages, as it undermines the threat-point
of employees. As the replacement rate drops less than
in the previous experiment, the reduction in unemploy-
ment is smaller. 
The participation effect for unskilled partners is smaller,
since the credit for the unskilled is smaller. However, the
credit also stimulates participation of low- and high-skilled
partners on the labour market. Although labour supply in
hours may drop slightly due to the income effect, this
effect is dominated by the positive effect on total labour
supply, due to an increase in the participation rate.
The marginal tax rate does not rise if the EITC is not
phased out. Indeed, the third column of Table 2 reveals
that the marginal tax burden even falls because some peo-
ple may fall in the phase-in range. This may raise the invest-
ment in human capital and reduce labour supply on the
black market. Accordingly, this design of the EITC yields
more favourable effects for production, but is less effec-
tive in reducing unemployment.
More targeting
In the fourth and fifth columns of Table 2, we show the
results of an EITC that has a more rapid phase-out range,
namely, between 115% and 150% of the minimum wage
(the fourth column) or between 115% and 130% of the min-
imum wage (the fifth column). The advantage of more tar-
geting is that the maximum credit for people who earn
the minimum wage rate can be larger, thereby cutting the
replacement rate of the unskilled more substantially.
The disadvantage is that the marginal tax rate in the phase-
out range increases more sharply and the (larger) decline
in the replacement rate applies to fewer persons.
A moderately targeted version of the EITC (fourth col-
umn of Table 2) is slightly more effective in reducing the
aggregate unemployment rate than the most targeted
EITC (fifth column of Table 2). Also, compared to the less
targeted EITC (second column of Table 2), the moderately
targeted EITC is more effective in reducing the aggregate
unemployment rate. This suggests that an inverse U-
shaped curve describes how the effectiveness of the EITC
in cutting unemployment varies with the degree of tar-
geting. Hence, moderately targeting the EITC seems to be
the most effective way to reduce the overall unemploy-
ment rate.3
Design of an EITC
The Dutch proposal for an EITC based on hourly wages
thus seems better targeted at the low skilled than an EITC
based on annual income. According to our MIMIC simu-
lations, this targeting principle makes the EITC based on
hourly wages more effective in reducing the unemploy-
ment rate. Furthermore, the EITC based on hourly wages
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does not suffer from negative incentive effects on the
quantity of the labour supply. 
Apart from these positive effects, an EITC based on
hourly wages also has some drawbacks. First of all, MIMIC
reveals that the high marginal tax burden on hourly wages
may have adverse effects on incentives for training. This
has a negative effect on labour productivity. Furthermore,
it may slow down the upgrading of skills of those low-
skilled people currently in the labour force, thereby reduc-
ing the opportunities for the low-skilled unemployed to
find a job. The qualitative notion about the effects on human
capital is difficult to translate into a reliable quantitative
effect, since empirical evidence on the impact of taxes on
training is scarce. A second drawback of the EITC is that
it relies on additional information concerning workers,
namely the number of hours worked in the formal sector.
This information is currently not available to the tax author-
ity in the Netherlands and seems rather vulnerable to
fraud. As suggested by Van Koesveld (1998), one way
out of this problem is to provide the EITC to firms that
employ workers with low hourly wages. Firms are then
obliged to transfer the EITC to their employees. The advan-
tage of this is that the Dutch government has already intro-
duced a special relief programme for the social security
contributions of those employers who employ workers
with low hourly wages, the so-called SPAK. Hence, infor-
mation about the number of hours worked is already avail-
able from firms that are eligible for the SPAK. Another
advantage of the link between the EITC and the SPAK is
that take up is automatic: if the employer applies for the
SPAK for a certain employee, then the EITC is automati-
cally paid to that employee. This link also means that pay-
ment may occur throughout the year instead of in a lump
sum payment at the end of the year. A drawback of link-
ing the SPAK and the EITC is that it might be especially
vulnerable to fraud. Indeed, both the employer and the
employee face an incentive to report more hours worked
and lower hourly wages than is actually the case. Therefore,
the combination of a SPAK and an EITC based on hourly
wages is unlikely to be a permanent policy measure.
Furthermore, it is not obvious that the incidence of the
EITC is fully reaped by unskilled workers if it is provided
to the employer. Indeed, the EITC may be subject to a bar-
gaining game between the employer and the employee.
In that case, the EITC may not add much compared to the
existing SPAK.
A final drawback of the EITC is that most people receiv-
ing low hourly wages are young single persons or sec-
ondary earners who currently do not collect unemploy-
ment benefits (see CPB, 1997). Hence, this makes the EITC
ill-targeted at the low-skilled primary earners who are
looking for a full-time job. Indeed, most of primary earn-
ers with low skills receive wages above 130% of the min-
imum wage.
These problems in the design of an EITC based on hourly
wages have made the Dutch cabinet reluctant to actually
introduce it. Indeed, the government’s recent coalition
agreement has decided upon the introduction of a fixed
earned income tax credit of DFL 1,000 that does not con-
tain a phase-out range. Part-time workers who receive an
annual income below 70% of the minimum wage will
receive a percentage tax credit, rather than the full credit.
This makes the credit better targeted at workers with a
full-time job. Furthermore, it avoids problems associated
with a high marginal tax rate in the phase-out range of
the EITC. Indeed, our calculations with MIMIC suggest that
this policy is somewhat less effective in reducing unem-
ployment among the unskilled, but also less harmful for
the quality and quantity of labour supply.
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Notes
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the Netherlands. In particular, the uncompensated labour supply elasticity
for married women is set at 0.8, for single persons 0.25 and for married men
0.1. The income elasticities are 0.2 for women, 0.05 for single persons and
almost zero for men. 
2 The effects on unemployment have been largely ignored in studies for the
US, since structural unemployment is typically a European phenomenon.
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